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<h>Northern Ireland Conflict-Religion vs Politics

<p>   The conflict in Northern Ireland is likely one of the most closely
   watched andhotly debated disputes of our time. Spanning now for over a
   century, whatremains at the root of the conflict is unclear. Many
   theories have developedover time, yet no one theory seems to
   adequately describe the complex struggle. The conflict has been
   divided down many lines; ethnically between the Britishand the Irish,
   geographically, between the North and the South of Ireland,
   andreligiously between Protestants and Catholics. Theories that have
   emerged havepointed to causes such as land claims and a nationalist
   ideology, ethnicity andculture, and perhaps most frequently, religion
   when attempting to define theconflict. In fact, what is more likely is
   that elements of all of these issueslie at the root of what is
   commonly referred to as "The Troubles".The history of this
   contemporary conflict is detailed, but impossible to ignore.While
   different factions of the dispute would argue that the problem
   begancenturies ago, I will examine briefly the history of the
   "troubles" from the endof the 19th century forward. For much of its
   history, Ireland has lived underBritish rule. As the 19th century drew
   to a close, Britain became aware of arapidly growing sense of Irish
   Nationalism. In 1870, the Irish Protestantsplaced the notion of Home
   Rule on the front burner in an attempt to separateIreland from the
   rapid secularism that was occurring in Britain. Very quicklythe
   movement was picked up by Irish Catholics who saw Home Rule as a
   trulynationalist ideal, and by 1874 they had dominated the movement.
   This pushed theProtestants back towards Unionism and was one of the
   many strikes against theidea of a united Ireland.

<p>   Feeling tremendous pressure to grant Ireland Home Rule, Britain began
   to talkabout making efforts to "pacify" Ireland, implying that it
   would indeed granttheir wish. Talks of Home Rule were then delayed.
   The Irish saw the delay as afurther political tactic of a British
   parliament who had no intention ofgranting them autonomy. The British
   struggled with the question of who wouldrun this complex society that
   was so heavily rooted in imperialistic tradition,and who at best had a
   shaky industrial and political structure. This delayfurther divided
   Irish nationalists. New radical forms of nationalism emerged,such as
   the Irish Republican Brotherhood and Sinn Fein, whose leaders
   werewilling to use violent means if necessary to secure Irish
   independence.A further divide between Protestants and Catholics also
   developed at this time,particularly in the northern province of
   Ulster. Unionists groups, who wereProtestant by religion and British
   by tradition, were opposed to Home Rulebecause they believed that
   Ireland should maintain her ties to Britain. In aneffort to resist the
   Home Rule movement, they began to organize. They created aProvisional
   Government of Ulster, complete with a constitution and raised anarmy
   to defend it. Further to that, in 1912 they created what was called
   the`Solemn League and Covenant' which bound their followers to use any
   meansnecessary to resist Home Rule. They gathered over a half a
   million signatures,some of the Unionists even signing in their own
   blood.

<p>   The debate over Home Rule was put on hold when World War I broke out.
   TheDublin Easter Rising of 1916 served as a reminder to the British
   that thequestion of Ireland's independence would need to be answered
   when the war wasover. Over 220 people were killed and over 600 more
   injured when IrishRepublican Brotherhood rebels took hold of Dublin.
   The British, outnumberingthe rebels 20 to 1, eventually took back the
   city six days later. In the faceof what could have been a political
   victory for the British, they made the errorof executing the surviving
   Irish rebels, martyring them and instilling anger anddetermination in
   the minds of many Irish Nationalists.

<p>   The dilemma of Home Rule as the British saw it was how to given the
   IrishCatholics what they wanted while still providing for the Irish
   Protestants ofUlster. Their answer was the Government of Ireland Act
   of 1920, which createdtwo separate parliaments, one in the North and
   one in the South. Theseparliaments were charged with their own
   domestic affairs, but all foreignaffairs and income tax collection
   remained in the hands of the British.Further resistance and guerilla
   warfare eventually led to the Anglo-Irish Treatyof 1921, which
   outlined the creation of the Irish Free State, now known as
   theRepublic of Ireland. It was made up of the provinces of Munster,
   Leinster andConnaught, as well as three of the nine counties of Ulster
   - Donegal, Monaghan,and Cavan. Northern Ireland, now a legal entity
   made of up the six remainingcounties of Ulster - Fermanagh, Armagh,
   Tyrone, Londonderry, Antrim and Down -remained under British rule. The
   division created an almost entirely Catholicpopulation in the South of
   Ireland and a substantial Protestant majority in theNorth.

<p>   The partitioning of Ireland was viewed by the South as a temporarily
   solution tothe `Protestant' problem in the North. They maintained that
   not an inch ofIrish land would be given up to the British. In 1937,
   the creation of the IrishConstitution in the South laid claim to the
   six counties that remained underBritish rule and acknowledged that
   they were being held temporarily andillegally.

<p>   Population divisions had always existed in the two major cities of
   what was nowNorthern Ireland. Belfast, the largest city and center of
   economic activity hada largely Protestant population, where as Derry,
   a key center for the shippingindustry had a largely Catholic
   population. Both cities also boasted aconcentrated minority group, yet
   conflict was not always inherent, as theminority did not pose a threat
   to the majority's way of life. With the rise ofindustrialization,
   there was a rapid migration of people to Belfast,predominantly in
   search of work and housing. The majority of the peoplemigrating were
   Catholic, which began to present a problem for the
   Protestantcommunity. Not only were they competing for housing and
   employment, but thepercentage of Catholics in Belfast was not only
   rising, but they were beginningto organize. As they learned how to use
   political institutions to wieldinfluence, the Protestants became more
   resentful of their presence. To theCatholics, their eventual control
   over Belfast was inevitable. As BernardHughes, the only Roman Catholic
   representative on the Belfast City Council in1857 stated, "This town
   (Belfast) is governed by Protestants, but the bone andsinew of the
   town is Roman Catholic."(Brewer & Higgins 1998). What was born wasa
   conflict between the working class members of society, while the
   middle andupper classes struggled to maintain peaceful control. The
   peace was not tolast.

<p>   The decades to follow would be wrought with violence. Battles would be
   wagedbetween the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Ulster Defense
   Association andBritish paramilitaries. Thousands of innocent people
   would be killed in bombblasts, riots and sectarian killings. Even law
   abiding citizens lend support tothese groups, because the battle for
   the "Cause" on either side is paramount. What is it that turns these
   common citizens into killing machines? Whatprevents any kind of peace
   agreements from taking hold in this conflict riddennation? The answer
   is perhaps more complicated than the conflict.Theorists have struggled
   over a solution to "the Troubles" in Northern Irelandfor a number of
   years. Yet in seeking this solution, few have truly gotteninside the
   conflict. Northern Ireland's battle has produced not only anenormous
   human cost but also a unique population that has been raised
   inviolence. Understanding that population is key to any sort of peace
   agreement. That understanding lies in examining what motivates both
   sides of the conflict.The battle over land is one of the most common
   sources of conflict in history. It is not surprising then that it
   plays a role in this conflict. To the Irish,their identity was rooted
   in the Church and the Land. British imperialism sawthe implementation
   of land lordship in Ireland. Protestant landlords rentedland to
   Catholic tenants, turning an economic system into one wrought with
   deepreligious animosity. This represented not only conquest but
   religiouspersecution to the Irish. (Hickey 1984)The Famine of
   1845-1849 was a significant set back in Anglo-Irish relations.
   Itrepresented a failure of the British government to provide for the
   basic needsof the Irish. It was also seen by some as an attempt to
   pacify the Irishthrough starvation. The relief offered to Catholics
   during the famine alsofurthered the divide between Protestants and
   Catholics, as it was often offeredon the condition that they attend a
   Protestant church. It was becoming clearto Irish Catholics that the
   root of their hardship lay with the British andIrish nationalism
   gained momentum.

<p>   Another one of the theories that have been presented is that the
   conflict isrooted in ethnic or cultural difference. The obvious
   critique to this idea isthat the Protestant and the Catholic groups
   have one major thing in common -they are all Irish. Yet, these two
   groups would tend to differ in that belief.The label Protestant has
   come to signify the Irish of the North that identifythemselves with
   British tradition. They pledge allegiance to the British Crownand
   fight to maintain ties to Britain. Despite the fact that they were
   likelyborn in Ireland, they tend to associate themselves with being
   British. They arealso referred to as Unionists, Loyalists or
   Orangemen. On the flip side of thatare the Catholics. The population
   that falls under this label is consideredethnically Irish. They fight
   for a united Ireland, free from British rule. They attempt to maintain
   the Irish language of Gaelic, and although there arefew places left
   that use it pre-dominantly, it is still taught in Roman
   Catholicschools. These people are often referred to as Nationalists or
   Republicans.The Irish argument then is that there is a distinctly
   `Irish' culture that isbeing stifled by a `British' majority in
   Northern Ireland. The two keyselements of the `Irish' culture that
   make co-existence near impossible are thatit is rooted in a
   nationalist ideology and that Catholic beliefs are intertwinedwith
   that ideology. Their belief is that harmony can only exist when all
   ofIreland is united and the assimilation of the non-Irish is
   complete.The major problem with this plan is two-fold. Firstly,
   Protestants have aculture which they believe in and defend and do not
   wish to sacrifice. Secondly, Northern Ireland has existed as an
   independent state for over 80years, and has likely developed a kind of
   culture that is unique and that maynot blend well with the culture of
   the Republic of Ireland.

<p>   Religion seems to be the element that ties many of the theories on the
   conflicttogether. Under the above pretense, the labels Catholic and
   Protestant are usedto convey cultural and political connotations. Yet
   religion remains an integralpart of ones culture. In the battle over
   land, religion maintains its tiethrough the battle between Protestant
   landlords and Catholic tenants. Religioneven has political links, as
   many nationalists, such as D.P. Morgan, the founderof the Leader
   newspaper, believe that the two ideas are inseparable:

<p>   "When we look out on Ireland we see that those who
   believe, or may be immediately induced to believe, in
   Ireland as a nation are, as a matter of fact, Catholics...
   If a non-Catholic nationalist Irishman does not wish to
   live in a Catholic atmosphere let him turn Orangeman." (Hickey 1984)

<p>   It is important then to look seriously at the role that religion plays
   in theconflict in Northern Ireland.

<p>   There are two sides to the religion debate. One the one hand, some
   believe thatthe labels Protestant and Catholic are just that - labels
   used to define twowarring factions of the conflict in the absence of a
   real ethnic divide. Giventhat one can point to ideas of territorial
   dispute, nationalism and culture aspotential sources of conflict, it
   is easy to see where this opinion is formed.Yet when examined more
   closely, there is merit in the argument that there aredogmatic
   differences in the two religions which keep the conflict at
   astalemate. While both Protestantism and Catholicism are forms of
   Christianity,the beliefs surrounding how society should be structured
   can lead to politicalconflict.

<p>   Catholicism is a very closely knit religion. One of the key elements
   of thebelief is in the emphasis placed on prayer and sacraments. The
   individual whoadministers these sacraments becomes of the utmost
   importance, which results inthe creation of the priesthood. This
   suggests a social order where the leadershave significant control over
   the systems of a society.

<p>   Protestantism in contrast is based much more loosely. It is composed
   of severalforms of Christianity, including Anglican, Presbyterian,
   Methodist, Baptist andthe Church of Ireland. The appeal is much more
   direct - one where the ministerprepares parishioners to meet God
   directly. This poses a direct threat to thestructured organization of
   the Roman Catholic faith. Likewise, Protestants fearthat if Ireland is
   united, their faith will be consumed by Catholicism.Ultimately, the
   result is that the religious divide between these two groups isnot
   merely in symbolic membership, but also in the interpretation of
   theChristian faith. As indicated by Professor John Hickey, "it is more
   a questionof religion inspiring politics than of politics making use
   of religion." (Hickey1984) Religion is often downplayed as a cause of
   the conflict in NorthernIreland because Western pluralistic societies
   do not place as much emphasis onthe importance of religion in daily
   life.

<p>   The question then becomes how does one find a solution to a conflict
   thatis so multifaceted? Belfast child psychologist Morris Frazer
   indicatesthat what Northern Ireland is now faced with is "a generation
   of childrenwho have lived with fear, have been taught to hate and who
   now aspire tokill." (Morrissey and Smyth 2002). Here in lies the
   starting point toresolution - education. It has become clear that in
   order to implementa peace agreement between Protestants and Catholics,
   and to make positiveprogress towards a bi-national state, a bottom-up
   approach must be used.

<p>   There are a few key things that must be taken into consideration by
   all sides. The first is that violence is not now, nor will it ever be,
   a successfulbargaining tool. Further to that is the idea that a peace
   agreement cannot endat the absence of direct violence. Progress must
   be made towards a model ofpositive peace. In order to achieve this,
   negotiations must consider thepositions of the minority - Catholics in
   Northern Ireland and Protestants inIreland as a whole. No one groups'
   rights can be infringed upon. This wouldlead almost naturally to the
   idea of a bi-national state. Coexistence is thebest chance that
   Ireland has at unification. It is the only real way to obtainpositive
   peace and a stable infrastructure.

<h>   Peace Process

<p>   Bombings, shootings and countless other acts. Will the violence ever
   end?Will peace and stability ever come? These were the questions
   thatfor most of Northern Irelands history best described prospects for
   asolution. For generations unionist and nationalist communities had
   beenseparated as well as isolated from each other, turning to
   demonstrationsof community strength to meeting with each other in
   negotiation andcooperation. For the most part, the earliest attempts
   at peace attemptedto make only mechanical political solutions. These
   only reinforcedthe already opposing relationships. Relative calm
   followed the IrelandAct of 1949, which created the Republic of Ireland
   in the south. By the1950s, even Catholics in the North, still securely
   tethered to Britain,seemed ready to accept equality rather than
   pushing for securing a moreunited Ireland, scholars note. But that
   changed after Northern Ireland'sCatholics organized a large
   demonstration protesting discriminationin voting rights, housing and
   unemployment in 1968. A police crackdownfollowed, sparking months of
   violence and a reemergence of the Republicanmovement. The subsequent
   bloody riots between Protestants and Catholicsmarked the beginning of
   The Troubles, the euphemism for the period ofviolence that would
   continue for years in Northern Ireland.

<p>   Both the Irish Republican and British sides experienced breakthroughs
   in the1980s that would help to prepare the ground for the peace
   process. Thepropaganda campaign around the hunger strikes started the
   Sinn Fein involvementin electoral politics and community action. It
   was this event that started atransformation. This was the beginning of
   Sinn Fein's ascendancy over the IRA. This was the beginning of a shift
   in emphasis from a military strategy to aprimarily political one, and
   a lowering margin of victory on which theRepublican outlook was
   focused, from the absolute principle of the right of theIrish people
   as a whole to self-determination towards ensuring that theimmediate
   interests of their core base of support were sufficiently
   representedin and by British state institutions. This move into party
   politics would endup leading Sinn Fein to end their commitment to not
   take their seats in theDail, a commitment which had been a key
   principle for Republicans since as farback as the 1920s. In taking
   their seats in the Irish Parliament and later inlocal councils in
   Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein was explicitly recognizinginstitutions set
   up under partition and thus implicitly recognizing thepartition of the
   country itself.

<p>   When Republicans did engage in a peace process contacts like
   nationalist JohnHume were to be important. With the additional support
   from sections ofIrish-America this cooperation with 'constitutional'
   nationalism became thepan-nationalist alliance. This connection acted
   as the go through whichRepublicans were able to ease their movement
   from a confrontational approach toa placatory one. The role of
   intermediaries was to become very important in thepeace process.
   During the late 1980s contacts were made and a network ofconnections
   developed. But at this stage the contacts were largely secret
   andunfruitful, a reflection of both the pariah status of Republicans
   and thedistance between their stance and that of other political
   actorsIt was not until these existing relationships were challenged,
   most crucially inthe Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and subsequently in
   several other initiativesjointly determined by the British and Irish
   governments, that the main partiesbegan to participate in efforts to
   create a democratic peace. The search forpeace had always been
   overwhelmed by the violence that reinforced separation. The British
   government's negotiation and signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreementwith
   the government of the Republic of Ireland in 1985 marked some
   developmentsthat were to be important for the peace process. The
   Agreement brought theBritish government closer with the government of
   the Republic of Ireland. Thiswas also significant for moving away from
   viewing Northern Ireland as a purelydomestic matter for the British
   government. The introduction and maintenance ofthe Agreement was
   achieved against the express wishes of Ulster unionists. Thiswas an
   indication of the declining power of the Unionists in Northern
   Ireland. Unlike the Power-sharing Assembly of 1974, Unionists failed
   in their attempts towreck the Agreement. Such a failure also indicated
   that the British governmentwas prepared to face down Unionist
   opposition.

<p>   The current peace process began in April 1993 when John Hume, leader
   of theSDLP, and Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein, met to discuss the
   future ofNorthern Ireland. An idea of determination for the people of
   Ireland was amajor priority. And they hoped these discussions would
   lead to a historicalagreement between the British and Irish
   governments. A key element of thisdiscussion was that Britain should
   be willing to allow the people of Ireland todecide their own political
   future. This meant that they had to accept thepossibility of a united
   Ireland. Furthermore, they were to call on Britain todeclare it had no
   selfish, political, strategic, or economic interest inNorthern
   Ireland.

<p>   SF in past years had shown some signs that they wished to peacefully
   anddemocratically reach a political settlement in Northern Ireland.
   Through theircoming together, Hume and Adams signaled a change in the
   Nationalists approachto the Northern Irish situation which would,
   eventually, entail Republicansbeing willing to abandon violence. In
   this approach, Nationalist leaders hopedto appeal to a much larger
   percentage of the nationalist community and to theIrish people of the
   Republic. Violence had reduced support for the Nationalistcause in the
   Republic of Ireland. The task of SF would be to convince the IRAthat
   they could achieve their political aims without the use of
   paramilitaryforce.

<p>   The discussions between Hume and Adams would be the driving factor to
   talksbetween the British and Irish governments. In June 1993 both
   governments cametogether to discuss the future of each governments
   relationship to NorthernIreland. For six months, both governments
   would try to reach a compromise. Themain debate focused on the
   question of self-determination. In the end theBritish government could
   not accept self-determination for the people of Irelandas a whole. On
   15 December 1993 the Joint Declaration on Peace was released. To
   Republicans, the declaration was not seen as a solution to the
   conflictbetween the two communities. The document claimed to create a
   structure inwhich a peaceful political settlement could come about.

<p>   Both British and Irish governments knew that no democratic process
   could beinfluenced by violence. It was also known that if the talks
   were to produce anylasting settlement the process would have to be as
   inclusive as possible. Theabsence of political parties that
   represented the various paramilitary groupswas seen as a drawback to
   the possibility of a permanent settlement. Therefore,it was considered
   essential that Loyalist and Republican paramilitary groupsshould be
   encouraged to enter into cease-fires.

<p>   While politicians had struck a compromise, paramilitary groups had
   not.Republicans spent some time seeking clarification on the Joint
   Agreement. Onlywhen they felt the agreement would allow them to pursue
   their objectivespolitically would they consider a cease-fire. Loyalist
   violence was a responseto Republican violence, but it was also a sign
   of their insecurity regardingtheir relationship with the British
   government. Although unionists were in themajority in Northern Ireland
   and the document would only allow a united Irelandto be achieved by
   majority consent from the Northern Ireland population,unionists no
   longer felt they help the power.

<p>   The SF put a lot of effort into the process that eventually was to
   bring aboutan IRA cease-fire. SF was convinced that the IRA's
   objectives could be achievedbetter through democratic means. The SF
   argument clearly influenced the leadersof the IRA. On 31 August 1994
   the IRA announced their cease-fire. Though it wasa victory for peace,
   it was not an all-inclusive Republican cease-fire. Therewere other
   less known groups such as the Irish National Liberation Army
   andRepublican Sinn Fein that did not consider themselves bound by the
   IRA'scease-fire. A long and violent six weeks had past before the CLMC
   announced acease-fire of their own.

<p>   In 1995 both governments introduced a new Framework for Agreement.
   Peace inNorthern Ireland helped the British and Irish governments find
   a new confidencein their dialogue. Not only was the document a
   continuation of issues discussedin The Joint Declaration for Peace, it
   also introduced new ideas for futuregovernmental structures. Not
   everybody in the nationalist community rejectedthe framework. Some
   believed the agreement would be beneficial for the commongood, the
   proposed structures had the potential to benefit both
   communitieseconomically. However, the unionists did not see it in the
   same way. They feltthreatened and betrayed by the document,
   particularly by the proposedNorth/South structures. In their opinion,
   a North/South institution with anykind of political power was a sure
   sign of a step towards Irish unity.The decommissioning of paramilitary
   arms became an important issue as NorthernIreland moved towards
   multi-party talks. It became apparent that some of theparticipants
   would only accept those parties, who were linked to
   paramilitaryorganizations, into a talk's process if weapons were first
   handed over. Opposing parties saw this not only as unrealistic but
   also as an unfairprecondition on the entry to talks. Despite the
   Mitchell report, the Britishdecided a separate committee should be
   formed on the question of decommissions. This didn't go over well with
   Sinn Fein or the IRA. On February 9th, the IRAended their cease-fire.
   The process was to go on.

<p>   Talks opened June 1996. The UDP and PUP were allowed to remain in
   talks becausethe CLMC Cease-fire had held under difficult
   circumstances. As expected, SF wasnot allowed to enter the talks
   because the IRA had not resumed its cease-firebefore the talks began.
   It would stay without Sinn Fein and be overshadowed byIRA violence
   most of the time. As September 1997 grew closer, and SF recognizedthe
   British government's desire to include them in the talks or else
   proceedwithout them, the Republican movement reassessed its political
   situation. JohnHume argued that a resumption of the cease-fire was
   once again within reach ofthe government. On July 18th Hume and Adams
   released a joint statement thatsaid lasting commitment would only be
   achieved if it is based on principles ofdemocracy and equality and has
   the allegiance of both traditions. Two dayslater, the IRA resumed its
   cease-fire. Both governments reacted with reservedhope and waited to
   see if the cease-fire was genuine. If it were clear the IRAhad
   abandoned all paramilitary activity for six weeks, then SF would be
   allowedto enter the talks in September. The cease-fire held, SF was
   admitted into thetalks, and not surprisingly, their arrival marked the
   departure of the DUP andUKUP. After a sincere effort by both
   governments to make the multi-party talksall inclusive, the talks
   still lacked representation from all parties.Violence had a direct
   impact on multi-party talks as the early months of 1998brought the
   suspension of two parties from the process. The UDP and SF, afterboth
   governments concluded that they had breached the Mitchell principles.
   TheUDP is considered as the political wing of the paramilitary group
   the UDA / UFFwhich had been linked to many killings. It was made clear
   that they would beallowed back into the talks after a period of time
   if they remained committed tothe Mitchell principles. In late February
   1998, SF was also suspended from thetalks. Both governments believed
   those two killings, that of a Loyalistparamilitary and a Catholic drug
   dealer, was the work of the IRA. As the talkswere nearing the May 1998
   deadline, the two governments set an exclusion of twoweeks provided
   there were no further breaches of the Mitchell principles. Alittle
   less than a month after the UDP walked out of the talks, they
   rejoinedthem on 23 February 1998. Despite Unionist claims that the IRA
   was linked torecent bombings, SF also were allowed back in the talks
   on 23 March 1998.In an effort to overcome the political gridlock, the
   independent chairman of themulti-party talks set a deadline for
   agreement as the 9 April 1998. Thedeadline did give the process a new
   sense of urgency and had been a good idea. During the last week of
   March and the first week of April serious problems stilllay in the
   path of a political. Not surprisingly, Unionists and Nationalistswere
   divided over how power would be shared in the proposed Northern
   IrelandAssembly, and the extent to which the Irish government would
   have influence overNorthern Ireland under the proposed North-South
   structures.

<p>   In retrospect, the tensions that were apparent between the various
   groupingswere an indication of the historical compromise that was
   being asked of allsides. The midnight deadline, of 9 April 1998, was
   not achieved but parties andgovernments stayed at the Stormont castle
   until an agreement was reached. Theimminent arrival of the Easter
   weekend, and the prospect of a collapse of thetalks, gave the process
   and participants a last push. The news of theAgreement was reported in
   the late afternoon on Good Friday. Amazingly all theparties involved
   in the talks attended the final session in which GeorgeMitchell
   announced that an agreement had been reached and that the
   multi-partytalks were at end. Those involved in the process were
   careful not to claim itas a victory for any particular party, but
   rather as the best agreement thatcould be achieved in the
   circumstances.

<p>   Is this a complicated process? It most definitely is, but it is not
   impossible.Some people feared that these events would derail the peace
   process. Others weredetermined not to let that happen. After the 1998
   Omagh bombing incident, aspokesman for British Prime Minister Tony
   Blair said, What the last few daysactually have shown is that the
   Agreement and the peace process have survivedand have emerged
   strengthened from the process.

<p>   It is unclear yet whether this sentiment is true, or is merely wishful
   thinking.In the past, there have been agreements reached that
   subsequently fell apart.Will this one be different? Maintaining this
   agreement will require tremendouswillpower on both sides. People who
   have traditionally resolved disputes throughthe use of guns and bombs
   will have to learn the art of compromise. On the daythe agreement was
   reached, President Clinton said:

<p>   "All friends of Ireland and Northern Ireland know the task of making
   the peaceendure will be difficult. The path of peace is never easy.
   But the parties havemade brave decisions. They have chosen hope over
   hate, the promise of the futureover the poison of the past. And in so
   doing, already they have written a newchapter in the rich history of
   their island -- a chapter of resolute couragethat inspires us all."

<p>   It seems clear that the majority of people are ready to undertake this
   challengein return for a peaceful existence. Will their leaders be
   able to follow theirwishes? Only time will tell.

<h>   Bibliography

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<l>   Dixon, Paul: Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace. NewYork:
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<l>   Eames, Robins Dr.: "Protestant Perceptions of the Peace Process
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<l>   Geraghty, Tony. The Irish War: The Military History of a
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<l>   Halliday, Fred. "Irish Nationalism's in Perspective".
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<l>   Hickey, John. Religion and the Northern Ireland Problem. New
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<l>   Lambkin, B.K. Opposite Religions Still? Brookfield: Avebury, 1996.

<l>   McGarry, John: Northern Ireland and the Divided World. New York:Oxford
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<l>   Morrissey, Mike and Marie Smyth. Northern Ireland After the GoodFriday
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   2002.O'Farrell, Patrick. Ireland's English Question. London: B.T.
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<l>   O'Malley, Padraig. The Uncivil Wars: Ireland Today. Boston:
   BeaconPress, 1997.

<l>   Wolff, Stefan. "The Road to Peace?" World Affairs Spring 2001.

<p>   by Anonymous Student
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